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Abstract
Following Stollery (1998), we extend the Solow DasguptaHeal model to analyze the
e¤ects of global warming The rise of temperature is caused by the use of fossil resources
so that the temperature level can be linked to the remaining stock of these resources. The
rise of temperature a¤ects both productivity and utility. We characterize optimal solutions
for the maximin and zero-discounting cases and present closed form solutions for the case
where the production and utility functions are Cobb-Douglas, and the temperature level
is an exponential function of the remaining stock of resources. We show that a greater
weight of temperature in intratemporal preferences or a larger intertemporal elasticity of
substitution both lead to postpone resource use.
JEL Classication: Q32
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1 Introduction
Global warming and its consequences for the welfare of future generations appear more and
more as one of the foremost economic issues asking for proper policies. The depletion of the
stock of fossil resources plays a major role in this phenomenon. A policy such as a tax on
hydrocarbon-burning is necessary to control the depletion of the stock of resource and the
ensuing rise of temperature. To a large extent, this amounts to a simple reallocation of carbon
dioxide emissions from today to the future. Its consequences for the welfare prole of the
various generations is quite important however. Capital accumulation and technical progress
may mitigate the consequences for future generations of the depletion of natural resources.
There is no doubt however that laisser-faire will not yield optimal results and that government
intervention is required.
The design of the optimal tax response to climate change requires the choice of a social
criterion to weight the welfare levels of current and future generations1. The standard one
is the discounted utilitarian criterion. Social welfare is a weighted sum of the utilities of the
di¤erent generations. A positive rate of discount implies that society cares less and less for
generations as they become more distant in the future. An alternative is the maximin criterion.
According to the principle put forward by Rawls (1972) in A Theory of justice and introduced in
the natural resources and environmental economics literature by Solow (1974), society aims at
maximizing the welfare of its least-advantaged member or, in our case, generation. In regular
cases, this criterion ensures that each generation enjoys the same level of utility. Another
alternative is the zero discounting criterion (Ramsey (1928)). This criterion rests on the ethical
principle that di¤erent generations should have equal weights in social welfare. This does not
preclude, however, the admission of some substitution between the welfare levels of the di¤erent
generations.
We may wonder which generations are a priori disadvantaged in an economy where fossil
fuels are necessary but polluting, the present and near ones or the generations in the far future.
The unavoidable reduction of the stock of oil disadvantages future generations, because on
the one hand extraction is an input necessary to the production process, and on the other
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hand they su¤er from the temperature increase. When society discounts utilities, the process
of discounting obviously adds to this disadvantage. However, even in the absence of technical
progress, capital accumulation exerts a compensating inuence.
As has been shown by Dasgupta and Heal (1979) or Mitra (1980) when the sole source
of welfare is consumption and damages due to global warming are not taken into account,
consumption and therefore welfare are doomed to decrease and tend towards zero in the long
run when society discounts utilities, but may eventually be forever rising when it does not. The
feasible domain is biased in favor of present generations by positive discounting, in favor of
future ones by zero discounting. In any case, even if society puts equal weights on the di¤erent
generations welfare, it has to choose to what extent it is ready to substitute current welfare
for future welfare.
We shall be concerned in this article with the maximin and zero discounting criteria. The
second one is more general as it includes maximin as a particular case or, more precisely, as
the limit case of a zero elasticity of substitution between the welfares of di¤erent generations.
Ken Stollery (1998) developed a global warming version of the Solow (1974) maximin
model23. Temperature rising harms both productivity, for instance through lower agricultural
yields in countries with an already warm and dry climate, or through detrimental health ef-
fects, and welfare, for a host of reasons, among which the migration of coastal populations
due to sea-level rise, and damages from more frequent storms, heat waves, or tropical diseases.
Thus temperature should appear as an argument in both the production function and the
current utility of a representative agent. In Stollerys model, temperature is directly related
to cumulative oil extraction, and therefore to the current remaining stock of resource. This
simplifying assumption avoids the explicit modeling of the accumulation of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere. It amounts to neglect the absorption of carbon dioxide by natural sinks, thus
considering that carbon emissions are irreversible. Natural carbon absorption is possibly an
important feature of the global warming phenomenon4, but its extent and especially its stability
are controversial, so that discarding it is probably a reasonable assumption.
The e¤ects of temperature on production and utility are externalities, not taken into account
in the market decisions of private rms and households. We assume however that a Pigovian
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carbon tax internalizes these negative externalities, and thus concentrate on optimal paths of
extraction, production and consumption.
Stollery showed that the Hartwick (1977) invest resource rents applies in this extended
framework. In order to follow an optimal maximin path, society should invest in capital the
rents obtained from the extraction of the exhaustible resource. In other words, Genuine Saving,
the sum of investment in man-made capital and the real value of the destruction of the resource
stock, should be zero. Equivalently, society should consume its Net National Product, that is its
GDP calculated after due allowance for the destruction of its natural resources. This well-known
result o¤ers some neat theoretical foundations to the notion of a sustainable growth path. If
the current generation does not want to harm the welfare of future generations, it should not
consume more than its Net National Product, properly calculated.
Stollery was also able to develop a closed-form solution for the Cobb-Douglas case when
temperature only a¤ects the production function.
We generalize these results in two directions.
Building on dAutume and Schubert (2008a), we present a more general solution method of
maximin problems which also applies to the case in which temperature a¤ects current utility
negatively as well as current goods production. We then lay out the closed-form solution for
the case where production and utility are Cobb-Douglas and the function linking temperature
to the remaining stock of resource is exponential, as in Stollery (1998). We also show that an
aggregate of capital and resource stocks is conserved along the optimal path.
We are thus able to examine how a representative consumption path changes when the
parameter linking temperature to utility increases. The larger this parameter, the more gradual
the temperature rise is over the long run.
For the simpler case of temperature only a¤ecting current goods production negatively,
Stollery was able to show that current investment in produced capital was unchanging, as in
Solow (1974). We show that including the e¤ect on utility leads current investment in produced
capital to rise toward a bound.
In the second place we consider the more general case of a zero discounting social criterion.
Following here dAutume and Schubert (2008b), we show that a generalized Hartwick (1977)
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rule applies. In the maximin case, total investment, including the value of the depletion of the
stock of resource, should be constant. In the zero discounting case, total investment should be
increasing. As Ramsey (1928) rst showed in a pure growth framework, the new rule is that
the level of investment, evaluated in terms of utility, should depend on the distance between
the current and the long run value of utility.
We again provide closed-form solutions for the specic case considered in the rst part of
the paper.
2 Stollerys model
2.1 Discounted utility and maximin
Let us start with a standard discounted utilitarian version of Stollerys model:
max
Z
1
0
e tU(c(t); T (X(t)))dt (1)
_K(t) = F (K(t); x(t); T (X(t)))  c(t) (2)
_X(t) =  x(t) (3)
K0 and X0 given, (4)
with5
U(c; T ) =
u(c; T )1 1=
1  1=
: (5)
K(t) and X(t) are the stocks of capital and a fossil resource at time t. The resource, say
oil, is non-renewable and its level decreases unavoidably as the result of current extraction
x(t). The extracted amount is used for production, together with capital and an implicit and
constant quantity of labor. The production function F (K; x; T ) is increasing and concave in K
and x. Due to the constancy of labor, production operates with decreasing returns to scale.
Production is also a decreasing function of the temperature level T . The production of the
unique physical good is shared between investment _K and consumption c.
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The social welfare function is the discounted sum of current utility U(c; T ), with a positive
rate of discount . In order to clarify the distinction between intra and intertemporal prefer-
ences we dene U(c; T ) as an increasing function of another function u(c; T ) which describes
the instantaneous trade-o¤ between consumption and temperature. The positive parameter 
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between utility levels. A higher  means that
society puts less weight on the utilities of future generations. A higher  means that society is
more ready to accept substitution between the utilities of di¤erent generations. Function u is
increasing in c, decreasing in T and strictly quasi-concave.
Temperature itself is an increasing function of the stock of carbon in the atmosphere and
therefore, as carbon emissions are supposed to be irreversible, a decreasing function of the
remaining stock of resource X. As this stock necessarily decreases over time, temperature
will increase over time and eventually reach a maximum level when the stock of resource is
exhausted. As explained above, a higher temperature has a negative e¤ect on both production
and utility.
In the maximin version of the model, the discounted sum of utilities is replaced by the
minimum of current utilities over the whole horizon. The objective becomes
max min
t2[0;1)
u(c(t); T (X(t))): (6)
As shown in dAutume and Schubert (2008a), the maximin solution may be recovered by
making the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  tend to zero. This expresses the absolute
reluctance of society to substitute well-being in time. The rate of discount then plays no role.
If society only cares about the minimum level of all utilities, the weights attached to these
utilities becomes immaterial.
2.2 Optimality conditions for the discounted utility model
Proposition 1 Necessary conditions for an optimal discounted utility path are the following:
Uc = ; (7)
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_

= FK   ; (8)
q = Fx; (9)
_q
q
= FK  

FT +
uT
uc

T 0
q
; (10)
to which we should add the technical constraints (2) and (3) giving the evolution of K and X;
and the initial conditions (4).
Proof. These conditions are easily derived from the maximization of the Hamiltonian.  is the
co-state variable associated with capital K and q the absolute value of the ratio between the
two co-state variables. Note that uT=uc = UT=Uc.
q can be interpreted as the price of the resource in terms of the physical good. The marginal
productivity of capital FK is the real rate of interest r.
Condition (10) is the Hotelling rule. In the standard model it reduces to the fact that the real
price of a non-renewable resource should grow at a rate equal to the real interest. This condition
reects the increasing scarcity of the resource and is, more deeply, an e¢ciency condition linking
extraction and capital accumulation. In our case, the Hotelling rule must take into account the
impact of current oil extraction on global warming and the associated negative externalities.
The positive expression

FT +
uT
uc

T 0 is the marginal damage measured in terms of the
produced good. The price q paid by producers should be the sum of a net resource price p,
corresponding to the scarcity rent received by the owners of the resource elds, and a Pigovian
carbon tax  designed to internalize the externalities:
q = p+  : (11)
On a competitive market, the net price p of the resource grows according to the standard
Hotelling rule:
_p = rp: (12)
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From (10), (11) and (12), we deduce
_ = r  

FT +
uT
uc

T 0
and therefore
(t) =
Z
1
t
e 
R s
t
r(u)du

FT (s) +
uT
uc
(s)

T 0(X(s))ds:
At each point in time, the carbon tax should be equal to the discounted value of future marginal
damages to the environment.
This Pigovian tax varies with time and may be di¢cult to implement. More practical, if
approximate, taxes may be considered. Sinn (2008) present a recent discussion of the issue.
2.3 Optimality conditions for the maximin model
Various methods for solving maximin problems have been proposed, in particular by Solow
(1974), Leonard and Long (1992), Cairns and Long (2006). We rather follow the simple method
presented in dAutume and Schubert (2008a), which consists in making the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution tend to zero.
Proposition 2 Necessary conditions for an optimal maximin path are the following:
u(c;X) = u constant,
q = Fx; (8)
_q
q
= FK  

FT +
uT
uc

T 0
q
: (9)
together with the technical constraints (2) and (3) and the initial conditions (4).
Proof. From (5), we deduce Uc = u
 1=uc and therefore, using (7) and (8),
_u
u
= 

FK +
_uc
uc
  

; (13)
which reduces to the constancy of u when  tends to zero.
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3 Maximin optimal paths
3.1 The invest resource rents rule
A nice way to solve the maximin problem is to use the "invest resource rents" rule introduced
by Hartwick (1977):
G = _K + q _X = 0 or _K = qx: (14)
Genuine saving, or net investment, G is the sum of all investments realized at a given date,
taking into account the disinvestment represented by the depletion of natural resources. In
the present model, it is the sum of the positive investment in physical capital and the value of
the extracted amount of non-renewable resources. This sum has to be zero, which means that
society should compensate for the depletion of natural resources by investing an equal amount
in man-made capital. In other words, society should invest in man-made capital all the rents
provided by Nature through the use of non-renewable resources. This rule appears prima facie
as a natural way to preserve future generations interests.
This rule can also be linked to Net National Product or the so-called Green National Prod-
uct. GDP, the Gross Domestic Product, is gross in the sense that it does not take into account
the depreciation of physical capital. Much more seriously, it does not take into account either the
depreciation of natural capital. National accounting goes as if the destruction of non-renewable
resources had no cost. This important observation has led to the denition of Net National
Product.
In our framework, if Y = F (K; x; T ) describes the national product net of the depreciation
of physical capital, the true Net National Product is
Y net = Y   q _X:
As _K = Y   c;
G = 0 , Y net   c = 0:
Having zero genuine saving is equivalent to consuming Net National Product. This warrants
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that current consumption does not harm the consumption possibilities of future generations.
The problem with these new accounting notions is that they should rely on the right prices,
namely on prices which support an optimal growth path of the economy. Natural resources have
a market price. But even if perfect competition held, this price would a priori not reect the
externalities associated with global warming. The price q appearing in genuine saving should
satisfy the Hotelling rule and thus take into account the e¤ects of temperature on production
and utility. This would only be the case if the government implemented the right carbon tax.
The price of oil then internalizes all the relevant externalities associated with global warming.
This is what we assume in the following.
The "invest resource rent" rule has clear theoretical foundations:
Proposition 3 Together with the Hotelling rule (10), the "invest resource rents rule" (14)
yields a constant utility path and is therefore a necessary condition for a regular maximin
optimal path.
This propostion has been proved by Hartwick (1997) for the Solow (1974) model where
only consumption appeared in the utility function. A very general form, involving an arbitrary
number of capital goods and implicitly allowing for externalities has been proved by Dixit,
Hammond and Hoel (1980). Stollery (1998) proved that the proposition holds for his model,
where temperature appears in the production and the utility functions.
A simple calculation, along the lines of previous proofs, shows that, if the Hotelling rule
(10) holds,
_u = 0 , _G  rG = 0
where r = FK . Thus G = 0 implies the constancy of u. Dixit, Hammond and Hoel (1980) and
others proved a kind of converse, namely that G cannot be di¤erent from zero on an optimal
maximin path.
We retain that an optimal maximin path satises the "invest resource rents" rule. This will
allow us to nd closed-form solutions.
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3.2 Closed Form Solutions
Stollery was able to solve the case where temperature does not appear in utility, the production
function is Cobb-Douglas and the temperature function exponential:
Y (t) = K(t)x(t)T (X(t))  (15)
and
T (X(t)) = Te X(t); (16)
; ; ;  > 0;  +  < 1;  > :
T is the maximal temperature reached when oil is totally exhausted.
Stollerys solution is the following:
K(t) = K0 +
c
1  
t
X(t) =


ln(1 +B (K0; X0)K(t)
 ( )
 );
where the sustainable level of consumption c as well as the constant B (K0; X0) are explicit
function of the levels of initial stocks.
As temperature does not appear in the utility function, the maximin path is a constant
consumption path, as in Solow (1974). The main features of the Solow solution are conserved.
From the Cobb-Douglas production function (15), "invest resource rents" becomes _K = qx =
Y; and we have c = (1   )Y: The saving rate is constant. As consumption, production is
constant and so is investment. The stock of capital increases linearly with time, in order to
compensate for the unavoidable decrease of resource extraction. The stock of resource as well
as the extraction rate obviously tend to zero.
We turn to the case where current temperature a¤ects current utility negatively and, to this
end, follow dAutume and Schubert (2008a) method.
The system characterizing the optimal maximin path is composed of the Hotelling rule (10),
equation (9), "invest resource rents" (14) and u(c; T (X)) = constant.
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The di¤erential system is:
_K = Y (17)
_X =  Y 1=K =T (X)= (18)
Y =
C(u; T (X))
1  
; (19)
where C(u; T ) is the consumption level yielding a utility level equal to u when the temperature
level is T:
We then substitute Y in equation (17), eliminate time by dividing side by side (18) and
(17), and separate variables to get
 

C(u; T (X))
1  
  1 

T (X) 

 dX =
1

K =dK:
This integrates to
Z X0
X

C(u; T ())
1  
  1 

T () 

 d =
1

Z K
K0
 =d: (20)
This relation rests on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function, which yields
the simple investment rule _K = Y , but holds for any u(c;X) utility and T (X) temperature
functions. It could be used to derive general properties of the optimal path, depending of
the properties of the utility and temperature functions6. We rather focus on the simple case
considered by Stollery, where the utility function is also Cobb-Douglas:
u(c; T (X)) = cT (X) " or C(u; T (X)) = uT (X)"; " > 0: (21)
Proposition 4 Assume that the production, temperature and utility function are given by (15),
(16) and (21). Then the optimal maximin solution is the following:
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i) the highest sustainable level of utility is
u = (1  )

(  )
m
 
1 
T0
 
m
(1 )
 
1  e mX0
 
1  K
 
1 
0 (22)
where
m =
"(1  ) + 

;
ii) an aggregate of the stocks of capital and resource is conserved along the optimal path:
B(K;X)
def
= K
 

 
emX   1

= B (K0; X0) ; (23)
iii) the evolution of the capital stock is described by the following di¤erential equation:
_K = 
uT "0 e
"X0
1  
(1 +B (K0; X0)K
 
 
 ) 
"
"(1 )+ (24)
where T0 = T (X0) = Te
 X0 is the initial pre-industrial temperature.
Proof. Consider equation (20) with our specication of the di¤erent functions. Simple reason-
ing7 shows that the highest sustainable utility level is attained by letting K tend to innity
and X to zero. The resulting equation can be solved to obtain u. The rest of the proposition
follows.
The sustainable utility level depends positively of the initial endowments of man-made and
natural capital; moreover, it depends negatively on the initial temperature.
Function B (K;X) denes a family of "isoquants" or iso-utility curves. We can trace out
the level of K required over time as X tends to zero. These "isoquants" turn out to be convex
to the origin and asymptotic to the axes in the (K;X) plane, indicating that the model is well-
behaved. The economy will follow the iso-utility curve corresponding to the highest sustainable
utility level u in a downward direction, as man-made capital substitutes for oil.
It is not possible to integrate with usual functions the di¤erential equation (24) describing
the evolution of K(t): It appears however that optimal investment _K is no more constant as it
was in the Solow (1974) model. The result however holds in the limit, as _K tends to a constant
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as T and K tend to innity.
The case that Stollery solved is recovered by making " = 0.
3.3 E¤ects of a greater weight on temperature in the utility function
Temperature in the utility function captures the direct impact of global warming on welfare.
We now investigate more thorougly how the optimal paths are a¤ected by the value of "; the
parameter describing the weight of temperature in the utility function.
Let us rst examine the slope of the iso-utility curves dened by equation (23). This slope
is
dX
dK
=  
  

1  e mX
m
1
K
:
This slope is negative and it is easy to check8 that its absolute value is a decreasing function
of ". At any given point in the (K;X) plane, the larger ", the less steep is the iso-utility curve.
As this curve is the trajectory followed by the economy, this conrms that the economy reacts
by saving on the resource, on X:
We need however to be careful when making inferences at this point. A higher level of
" implies that the oil stock will be higher for any given level of capital, K(t) reached by
the economy. It does not tell us that the stock will be higher at any particular date under
consideration. We must examine the behaviour of _X(t) and _K(t):
Proposition 5 An increase of "
i) decreases the initial levels of production, consumption, capital accumulation and resource
extraction;
ii) increases the long run levels of production, consumption, capital accumulation.
Proof. Let g(m;X) =
 
1  e mX

=m. Derivative gm(m;X) =

(1 +mX)e mX   1

=m2 is
negative: the numerator is equal to 0 when X = 0 and its derivative with respect to X is
 m2Xe mX < 0; the numerator is therefore negative for any positive X:
Both _K and c are proportional to Y; and _X= _K = dX=dK; which is negative and obviously
decreases (in absolute value) through time, as K increases and X decreases.
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i) Let us check that an increase in " implies an initial decrease of production, Y . Using
equation (22), initial optimal consumption is
c(0) = uT0
" = 	g(m;X0)

1  (25)
where
	 = (1  ) (  )

1  T0
 

1 K
 
1 
0
does not depend on ": As g(m;X0) decreases in m; which itself increases with "; we nd that
a higher " induces the economy to have lower levels of consumption, capital accumulation and
production, initially. Since Y (0) = K0
x(0)T (X0)
  where x(0) is the only variable factor, we
infer that x(0) decreases9.
ii) The long run consumption level, reached when the oil stock is asymptotically exhausted
is
c1 = u
T
"
= uT0
"e"X0 = c(0)e"X0 : (26)
It increases with " if the following inequality holds: gm(m;X0)
g(m;X0)
+X0 > 0: We see easily that this
is equivalent to mX0 > 1 e
 mX0 ; which is always true. As c and _K are xed and independent
from " proportions of Y , the result follows.
This proposition is rather natural. A society more concerned with global warming (one
with a larger ") chooses a slower depletion of the resource, and this implies lower production,
consumption and capital accumulation "early" in the program and higher later on. The so-
ciety optimally sacrices some more goods consumption early on, but will benet from more
consumption later on and forever. The initial decrease in consumption, and oil extraction and
burning, is necessary to slow down the temperature increase. Eventually, temperature will
reach the same long run level, however, as it is determined by the stock of resources to burn.
A greater weight of temperature in the utility function only leads to a more gradual rise of
temperature.
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4 Zero-discounting optimal paths
We now assume zero discounting and follow the approach introduced by Ramsey (1928). The
objective function becomes
max
Z
1
0
[U(c(t); T (X(t)))  U] dt; (27)
where U is the constant long run level of utility.
We now assume  to be lower than unity in (5). Then U(c; T ) is negative and tends to zero
if u(c; T ) tends to plus innity. This implies that U is equal to zero. We assume ex ante that
there exist feasible paths such that u(c; T ) tends to innity as t tends to innity. We derive
optimality conditions, characterize the potential optimal solution and check ex post that this
is indeed the case for our specication of the production and utility functions.
The maximin case is obtained as a limit case for  = 0 (dAutume and Schubert (2008a)).
Society then refuses any intertemporal substitution and, in regular cases, utility remains con-
stant over time.
4.1 The behavior of genuine saving
The method proposed by dAutume and Schubert (2008b) yields what they called a "Keynes-
Ramsey-Hartwick" rule.
Proposition 6 Consider the zero-discounting problem (27) under the technical constraints (2)
and (3) and the initial conditions (4), with  < 1: On the optimal path genuine saving satises
the following rule:
G = _K + q _X =
U   U(c; T (X))
Uc(c; T (X))
: (28)
Proof. The result follows from Bellman10. Let V (K;X) be the value function of the problem.
Bellman equation is:
0 = max
c;x
[U(c; T (X))  U] + VK(K;X) [F (K; x; T (X))  c]  VX(K;X)x:
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First order optimality conditions are:
Uc = VK ; VKFx = VX :
Substituting in the Bellman equation, we obtain
0 = U(c; T (X))  U + Uc(c; T (X)) [F (K; x; T (X))  c  xFx(K; x; T (X))] :
As F (K;x; T (X))  c  xFx(K; x; T (X)) = _K   qx, the result follows.
This rule appears as a generalization of both the "invest resource rents" and the Keynes-
Ramsey rules. It describes the evolution of genuine saving. It generalizes to Stollerys model of
global warming a result proved by Ramsey (1928) in his pionneering model of growth. Using
variational calculus Ramsey derived a simple formula expressing investment as a function of
the stock of capital, and acknowledged the help of Keynes in the interpretation of this formula.
If society has a zero discount rate but is ready to accept intertemporal substitution, genuine
savings should not be zero but positive. According to the Keynes-Ramsey rule, its level depends
on the distance to the stationary point. More precisely, its value expressed in terms of utility
Uc
h
_K + q _X
i
is equal to the distance U U(c; T (X)) between current utility and its long run
value. Thus, the farther the economy from the stationary point, the higher its genuine savings
expressed in terms of utility.
With our specication (21) of the utility function, we have
Uc
U(c;X)
=

1 
1


uc
u(c;X)
=

1 
1


1
c
:
Taking into account U = 0, equation (28) becomes
G = _K + q _X =

1  
c:
With our Cobb-Douglas production function, q _X =  Y so that _K = Y + 
1 
c which,
together with _K = Y   c; yields the rule of production sharing between consumption and
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investment along the optimal path, and the value of genuine savings:
c = (1  b)Y;
_K = bY;
G =
b   Y;
with
1  b = (1  )(1  ):
The saving rate b lies between  and 1, and is equal to  when  = 0. Consumption, investment
and genuine savings all are constant shares of the gross national product. In the maximin case,
 = 0 and b =  so that genuine savings is equal to zero. When  > 0, genuine savings
is positive and even growing, as we shall check that Y is increasing. This of course does not
contradict the Keynes-Ramsey-Hartwick rule as marginal utility Uc decreases so that genuine
savings expressed in terms of utility decreases to zero.
4.2 Closed-form solution
The envelope theorem allows us to obtain the evolution of the shadow prices. Let
 = Uc(c; T (X)) = VK ;  = VX :
We get
_

=  FK ; (29)
_

=  

FT +
uT
uc

T 0
q
: (30)
The price of the resource stock in terms of capital is q = = so that
_q
q
= FK  

FT +
uT
uc

T 0
q
: (9)
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The Hotelling rule is the same as in the discounting or maximin case (equation (10)). This is
not surprising as this rule is a pure e¢ciency condition, which does not depend on the choice
of an intertemporal criterion.
The use of the Cobb-Douglas utility function (21) yields an explicit characterization of the
behavior of the shadow prices and therefore of the marginal values of both stocks.
Proposition 7 i) On the optimal path, the value of capital can be expressed as a function of
the sole capital stock, while the value of the resource can be expressed as a function of the sole
resource stock:
WK = K = B1K
1 
b ; WX = X = B2XT (X)
 
bm
 ;
where B1 and B2 are constants depending on initial conditions, and
bm = "(1  b) + 

:
ii) An optimal path exists if and only if
 > b; (31)
that is, if and only if
 >  + (1  ):
iii) On the optimal path, K tends to innity while X tends to zero.
Proof. i) With Cobb-Douglas production and utility functions, equations (29) and (30) take
the form
_

=  
Y
K
=  
b _KK ;
_

=
Y + "c
 Y
x
T 0(X)
T (X)
=  
bm

_T
T
;
Thus the shadow price of capital can be expressed as a function of the sole capital stock, while
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the shadow price of the resource can be expressed as a function of the sole temperature:
 = B1K
 

b ;  = B2T (X)
 
bm
 ;
where B1 and B2 are constants. The values WK et WX of the capital and the resource stocks
follow.
ii) and iii)WK tends to zero as time tends to innity i¤  < b andK tends to zero, or  > b
and K tends to innity. If the capital stock were to tend to zero, production and consumption
would do the same as the resource input also has to tend to zero. This cannot be optimal in
a model with zero discounting. (31) follows. WX tends to zero as time tends to innity if and
only if XT (X) 
bm
 tends to zero. As T (X) must be nite, X has to tend to zero.
Condition (31) is more stringent that the condition  >  required in the maximin case.
Moreover, it involves technological parameters only in the maximin case, whereras it involves
here both technological and preference parameters. Along the optimal path, the capital stock
grows without limit, in order to maintain an increasing consumption in spite of the decrease in
resource use. The resource is asymptotically exhausted.
Proposition 8 The optimal solution for an optimal maximin path is the following:
i) An aggregate of the stocks of capital and resource is conserved along the optimal path:
bB(K;X) def= K  bb  ebmX   1 = bB (K0; X0) : (32)
ii) The evolution of the capital stock is described by the following di¤erential equation:
_K = ^ bA h1 + bB (K0; X0)K1 b i  "(1 b)"(1 b)+ 1  K (b )b(1 ) (33)
iii) The instantaneous utility level
u = (1  b)T " bA h1 + bB (K0; X0)K1 b i ""(1 b)+ 1  1 b1 K (b )b(1 ) (34)
20
is an increasing function of K and therefore increases without limit along the optimal path.
This implies that U = u1 1==(1  1=) tends to U = 0 as time and capital tend to innity.
Proof. i) The Hotelling rule (10) now reads
_q
q
=

^
_K
K
 
bm

_T
T
:
This shows that q can be expressed as a simple function of K and T (X):
q = 0K

b T (X) 
bm
 ; (35)
with
0 = q0K
 

b
0 T (X0)
bm
 : (36)
As in the maximin case, the solution is obtained by time elimination and variable separation.
The ratio of the two equations of motion _K = bY and _X =  x =   Y
q
yields, using (35):
dX
dK
=  
b 1q =   10 bK b T (X) bm :
Thus we obtain
T (X) 
bm
 dX =  
1
0
bK ^ dK;
which integrates in Z X
X0
T () 
bm
 d =
1
0

  b

K
1 
b  K
1 
b
0

:
In order to get an explicit solution we revert to Stollerys temperature function (16) so that
the previous equation becomes
1bm  ebmX   ebmX0 = 10   b

K
1 
b  K
1 
b
0

: (37)
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Making X ! 0 and K !1 in equation (37) then yields, as  > b;
1bm  1  ebmX0 =   10   bK1 

b
0 ; (38)
which determines 0 and therefore q0; by equation (36):
q0 = 0K

b
0 e
bmX0 =  bm
  b K01  e bmX0 : (39)
We also have, from (37),
1bm  ebmX   1 = 10   bK1 b : (40)
Dividing side by side equations (40) and (38) allows us to obtain (32).
ii) From (35), (38) and (32) we obtain
q
K
= 0K

b
 1
ebmX =  bm
  b K
1 
b
0
ebmX0   1K

b
 1
ebmX
=
 bm
  b 1ebmX0   1

K0
K
1 
b
"
1 +

K0
K

b
 1  
ebmX0   1# :
Using q = Y=x with x taken from the production function (15) and using (32) again yields
bm
  b 1ebmX0   1

K0
K
1 
b
"
1 +

K0
K

b
 1  
ebmX0   1#1   bm = Y 1  1K  1T   :
Then
Y = bA h1 + bB(K0; X0)K1 b i  "(1 b)"(1 b)+ 1  K (b )b(1 ) ; (41)
where bA =  ( b) bBbm  1  T  1  is a positive constant. This equation yields, using _K = bY; the
di¤erential equation in K (33), impossible to integrate with the usual functions. It is easy to
check that this equations reduces to (24) when  = 0:
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iii) We now turn to the expression of u. We have
u = cT (X) " = (1  b)Y T "e"X ;
which, using equations (41) and (32), yields equation (34). As  > b > ; u is an increasing
function of K and therefore increases without limit along the optimal path.
Equation (32) denes a family of trajectories in the (K;X) plane. Initial endowments
(K0; X0) determine the relevant trajectory. The economy follows this curve in a downward di-
rection, as man-made capital substitutes for natural capital. The capital stock tends to innity,
as the resource stock tends to zero. In the maximin case, these trajectories, dened by equation
(23), are iso-utility curves. When  6= 0 utility is growing along each one of these trajectories.
5 Concluding Remarks
Thus Stollerys global warming model represents an interesting and elegant extension of Solow
(1974). Increased consumption compensates agents for the disutility implied by the unavoidable
rise in temperature and allows them to maintain a constant level of utility. We have been able
to complement Stollerys analysis and to provide a closed-form solution for the case where
temperature also has a direct e¤ect on utility. This allowed us to identify the role played by a
temperature externality in utility. It leads to less physical production and consumption in the
short run, in order to save the resource and prevent an excessive rise in temperature. But it
also boosts consumption and production later on and forever, as capital accumulation benets
from the postponement of the rise in temperature.
We also considered a more general zero-discounting criterion which enables us to examine
the e¤ects of greater acceptance of intergenerational substitution of welfare levels, and show
that it plays to the advantage of future generations. To the contrary, a maximin criterion
appears to protect current generations.
Our results are dependent on the two assumptions of Cobb-Douglas production and utility.
The rst one captures in a simple way the essential role of the resource as it states that
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it is impossible to produce without resource. This does not prevent the resource stock from
converging to zero, but only at the limit when time goes to innity and an innite amount
of produced capital, in the limit of time, become available to substitute for the vanishing
resource. An interesting extension to consider is the case of a CES utility function, with limited
substitution between consumption and the temperature disamenity. As shown in a slightly
di¤erent context in dAutume and Schubert (2008a), the optimal solution would then be not
only to postpone extraction but also to maintain forever some nite portion of the oil stock, an
amount endogenously determined, thus preventing the temperature from reaching its maximal
level.
Notes
1We do not study intra-generational inequality and are only concerned with the welfare of a representative
member of each generation.
2We honor the memory of researcher Ken Stollery (1948-2005) who was struck down by illness at a tragically
early age.
3Hamilton and Ulph [1995] developed a somewhat di¤erent version of a Solow model with global warming
independently of Stollery.
4See for instance Farzin and Tahvonen (1996).
5We drop the time argument when no ambiguity arises.
6DAutume and Schubert(2008a) show that a CES utility function implies that society will choose to conserve
forever a strictly positive level of resource, which is endogenously determined.
7See dAutume and Schubert (2008a).
8See the proof of the following proposition.
9This result also derives from the fact that x(0)= _K(0) =  dX(0=dK(0) decreases with ":
10It also derives from the nullity of the Hamiltonian.
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